Digest: Cebu Royal Plant vs Minister of Labor

G.R. No. L-58639 August 12, 1987

CEBU ROYAL PLANT (SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION), vs.
THE HONORABLE DEPUTY MINISTER OF LABOR and RAMON PILONES

Subject: Labor Standards

FACTS:

Ramon Pilones, private respondent, was employed on February 16, 1978 on a probationary period of employment for six (6) months with petitioner CRP. After said period, he underwent medical examination for qualification as regular employee but the results showed that he is suffering from PTB minimal. Consequently, he was informed of the termination of his employment by respondent since his illness was not curable within 6 months.

Pilones complained against his termination before the Ministry of Labor which dismissed the same. The dismissal was reversed by the public respondent who ordered the reinstatement and payment of back wages.

Granting reinstatement, the public respondent argues that Pilones was already a permanent employee at the time of his dismissal and so was entitled to security of tenure. The alleged ground for his removal, to wit, “pulmonary tuberculosis minimal,” was not certified as incurable within six months as to justify his separation and that the petitioner should have first obtained a clearance, as required by the regulations then in force, for the termination of his employment.

CRP claims that the private respondent was still on probation at the time of his dismissal and so had no security of tenure. The dismissal was necessary for the protection of the public health, as he was handling ingredients in the processing of soft drinks which were being sold to the public.

ISSUE: Whether the dismissal was proper.

HELD:

No. The dismissal was not proper. Under Article 282 of the Labor Code, “an employee who is allowed to work after a probationary period shall be considered a regular employee.” Pilones was already on permanent status when he was dismissed on August 21, 1978, or four days after he ceased to be a probationer. As such, he could validly claim the security of tenure guaranteed to him by the Constitution and the Labor Code.

The petitioner claims it could not have dismissed the private respondent earlier because the x-ray examination was made only on August 17, 1978, and the results were not immediately available. That excuse is untenable. We note that when the petitioner had all of six months during which to conduct such examination, it chose to wait until exactly the last day of the probation period.

The applicable rule on the ground for dismissal invoked against him is Section 8, Rule I, Book VI, of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code which states that “the employer shall not terminate his employment unless there is a certification by a competent public health authority that the disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six (6) months even with proper medical treatment.” The record does not contain the certification required by the above rule. Hence, dismissal was illegal.

It is also worth noting that the petitioner’s application for clearance to terminate the employment of the private respondent was filed with the Ministry of Labor only on August 28, 1978, or seven days after his dismissal. As the NLRC has repeatedly and correctly said, the prior clearance rule (which was in force at that time) was not a “trivial technicality.” It required “not just the mere filing of a petition or the mere attempt to procure a clearance” but that “the said clearance be obtained prior to the operative act of termination.

Although we must rule in favor of his reinstatement, this must be conditioned on his fitness to resume his work, as certified by competent authority.

**Another Doctrine under Sec4 of Labor Code on construction:

Concern for the lowly worker who, often at the mercy of his employers, must look up to the law for his protection. Fittingly, that law regards him with tenderness and even favor and always with faith and hope in his capacity to help in shaping the nation’s future. It is error to take him for granted. He deserves our abiding respect. How society treats him will determine whether the knife in his hands shall be a caring tool for beauty and progress or an angry weapon of defiance and revenge. The choice is obvious, of course. If we cherish him as we should, we must resolve to lighten “the weight of centuries” of exploitation and disdain that bends his back but does not bow his head.

Digest: People vs Vera Reyes

People v. Vera Reyes, 67 Phil 190

Subject: Labor Standards

Doctrine: Police Power (Basis of State’s power to intervene) 

Facts:

The defendant was charged with a violation of Act No. 2549, as amended by Acts Nos. 3085 and 3958 The information alleged that from September 9 to October 28, 1936, and for the some time after, the accused, in his capacity as president and general manager of the Consolidated Mines, having engaged the services of Severa Velasco de Vera as stenographer, at an agreed salary of P35 a month willfully and illegally refused to pay the salary of said stenographer corresponding to the above-mentioned period of time, which was long due and payable, in spite of her repeated demands.

The accused interposed a demurrer on the ground that the facts alleged in the information do not constitute any offense, and that even if they did, the laws penalizing it are unconstitutional.

After the hearing, the court sustained the demurrer, declaring unconstitutional the last part of section 1 of Act No. 2549 as last amended by Act No. 3958, which considers as an offense the facts alleged in the information, for the reason that it violates the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt, and dismissed the case, with costs de oficio.

 

In this appeal the Solicitor-General contends that the court erred in declaring Act No. 3958 unconstitutional.

ISSUE: Whether the said constitutional provision is unconstitutional.

HELD:

No. The last part of section 1 considers as illegal the refusal of an employer to pay, when he can do so, the salaries of his employees or laborers on the fifteenth or last day of every month or on Saturday of every week, with only two days extension, and the nonpayment of the salary within the periods specified is considered as a violation of the law.

 The same Act exempts from criminal responsibility the employer who, having failed to pay the salary, should prove satisfactorily that it was impossible to make such payment.

The court held that this provision is null because it violates the provision of section 1 (12), Article III, of the Constitution, which provides that no person shall be imprisoned for debt.

We do not believe that this constitutional provision has been correctly applied in this case. A close perusal of the last part of section 1 of Act No. 2549, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 3958, will show that its language refers only to the employer who, being able to make payment, shall abstain or refuse to do so, without justification and to the prejudice of the laborer or employee. An employer so circumstanced is not unlike a person who defrauds another, by refusing to pay his just debt. In both cases the deceit or fraud is the essential element constituting the offense. The first case is a violation of Act No. 3958, and the second isestafa punished by the Revised Penal Code. In either case the offender cannot certainly invoke the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt.

Another doctrine:

Police power is the power inherent in a government to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the order, safety, health, morals, and general welfare of society. (12 C. J., p. 904.) In the exercise of this power the Legislature has ample authority to approve the disputed portion of Act No. 3958 which punishes the employer who, being able to do so, refuses to pay the salaries of his laborers or employers in the specified periods of time.

Undoubtedly, one of the purposes of the law is to suppress possible abuses on the part of employers who hire laborers or employees without paying them the salaries agreed upon for their services, thus causing them financial difficulties.

Without this law, the laborers and employees who earn meager salaries would be compelled to institute civil actions which, in the majority of cases, would cost them more than that which they would receive in case of a decision in their favor.

Digest: Calalang vs Williams

MAXIMO CALALANG vs A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL.,

G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940

Doctrine: Social Justice                   

LAUREL, J.:

Facts:

 

The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of the Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along the following for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic:

1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas

Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and

2)  along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to

Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm

The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to the Director of Public Works with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works the adoption of thethemeasure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in pursuance of the provisions of theCommonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director with the approval from the Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads.

On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of the recommendations made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission with modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the recommendations on August 10,1940. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.

Issues:

1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an unlawful inference with legitimate business or trade and abridged the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion?

2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people?

Held:

1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by the desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the public safety. Public welfare lies at the bottom of the promulgation of the said law and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which should not be made to prevail over authority because society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its preserving.

2) No. Social justice is “neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,” but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may  at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principles of salus populi estsuprema lex.

Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about “the greatest good to the greatest number.”

Digest: Cipriano vs CA

Subject: Torts and Damages

Topic: Violation of Rules and Statutes

 

[G.R. No. 107968.  October 30, 1996]

ELIAS S. CIPRIANO and/or E.S. CIPRIANO ENTERPRISES, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and MACLIN ELECTRONICS, INC.,respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS:  

E.S. Cipriano Enterprises, owned by petitioner Cipriano, is engaged in the rustproofing of vehicles, under the style Motobilkote.  On April 30, 1991, private respondent Maclin Electronics, Inc., through an employee, brought a 1990 model Kia Pride People’s car to petitioner’s shop for rustproofing. The job order showed the date it was received for rustproofing as well its condition at the time.  Neither the time of acceptance nor the hour of release, however, was specified.  According to the petitioner, the car was brought to his shop at 10 o’clock in the morning of April 30, 1991 and was ready for release later that afternoon, as it took only six hours to complete the process of rustproofing In the afternoon of May 1, 1991, fire broke out at the Lambat restaurant, which petitioner also owned, adjoining his Mobilkote rustproofing shop.  The fire destroyed both the shop and the restaurant, including private respondent’s car.

On May 8 1991, MACLIN sent a letter to petitioner, demanding reimbursement for the value of the Kia Pride.  In reply, petitioner denied liability on the ground that the fire was a fortuitous event (Art. 1174 and 1262, NCC), prompting private respondent to bring this suit for the value of its vehicle and for damages. Private respondent argued that petitioner was liable for the loss of the car even if it was caused by a fortuitous event.  It contended that the nature of petitioner’s business required him to assume the risk because under P.D. No. 1572, petitioner was required to insure his property as well as those of his customers.

RTC ruled in favor of MACLIN stating that the “failure of defendant to comply with P.D. No. 1572 is in effect a manifest act of negligence which renders defendant [petitioner herein] liable for the loss of the car even if the same was caused by fire,” and that rustproffing is “definitely covered” by P.D. No. 1572.  Since petitioner did not register his business and insure it, he must bear the cost of loss of his customers. CA affirmed the RTC’s decision.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner’s failure to abide by PD 1572 constitutes negligence

HELD:

We have already held that violation of a statutory duty is negligence per se. We stated that where the very injury which was intended to be prevented by the ordinance has happened, non-compliance with the ordinance was not only an act negligence but also the proximate cause.

Indeed, the existence of a contract between petitioner and private respondent does not bar a finding of negligence under the principles of quasi-delict. Petitioner’s negligence is the source of his obligation.  He is not being held liable for breach of his contractual obligation due to negligence but for his negligence in not complying with a duty imposed on him by law.  It is therefore immaterial that the loss occasioned to private respondent was due to a fortuitous event, since it was petitioner’s negligence in not insuring against the risk which was the proximate cause of the loss.

There is thus a statutory duty imposed on petitioner and it is for his failure to comply with this duty that he was guilty of negligence rendering him liable for damages to private respondent. While the fire in this case may be considered a fortuitous event,this circumstance cannot exempt petitioner from liability for loss.

WHEREFORE, the decision, dated November 18, 1992, of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with the modification that the award of attorney’s fees is DELETED.

Digest: Woodhouse vs Halili

CHARLES F. WOODHOUSE, plaintiff-appellant,  vs.
FORTUNATO F. HALILI, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-4811             July 31, 1953

Subject: BusOrg 1 (PAT)
Doctrine: Fraud

FACTS
On November 29, 1947, plaintiff Woodhouse entered into a written agreement with defendant Halili stating among others that: 1) that they shall organize a partnership for the bottling and distribution of Missionsoft drinks, plaintiff to act as industrial partner or manager, and the defendant as a capitalist, furnishing the capital necessary therefore; 2) that plaintiff was to secure the Mission Soft Drinks franchise for and in behalf of the proposed partnership and 3) that the plaintiff was to receive 30 per cent of the net profits of the business.
Prior to entering into this agreement, plaintiff had informed the Mission Dry Corporation of Los Angeles, California, that he had interested a prominent financier (defendant herein) in the business, who was willing to invest half a milliondollars in the bottling and distribution of the said beverages, and requested, in order that he may close the deal with him, that the right to bottle and distribute be granted him for a limited time under the condition that it will finally be transferred to the corporation. Pursuant to this request, plaintiff was given “a thirty days’ option on exclusive bottling and distribution rights for the Philippines”. The contract was finally signed by plaintiff on December 3, 1947.
When the bottling plant was already in operation, plaintiff demanded of defendant that the partnership papers be executed. Defendant Halili gave excuses and would not execute said agreement, thus the complaint by the plaintiff.
Plaintiff prays for the : 1.execution of the contract of partnership; 2) accounting of profits  and 3)share thereof of 30 percent with 4) damages in the amount of P200,000. The Defendant on the other hand claims that: 1) the defendant’s consent to the agreement, was secured by the representation of plaintiff that he was the owner, or was about to become owner of an exclusive bottling franchise, which representation was false, and that plaintiff did not secure the franchise but was given to defendant himself 2) that defendant did not fail to carry out his undertakings, but that it was plaintiff who failed and 3)that plaintiff agreed to contribute to the exclusive franchise to the partnership, but plaintiff failed to do so with a 4) counterclaim for P200,00 as damages.
The CFI ruling: 1) accounting of profits and to pay plaintiff 15 % of the profits and that the 2) execution of contract cannot be enforced upon parties. Lastly, the 3) fraud wasn’t proved

ISSUES

1. WON plaintiff falsely represented that he had an exclusive franchise to bottle Mission beverages
2. WON false representation, if it existed, annuls the agreement to form the partnership

HELD

1. Yes. Plaintiff did make false representations and this can be seen through his letters to Mission Dry Corporation asking for the latter to grant him temporary franchise so that he could settle the agreement with defendant. The trial court reasoned, and the plaintiff on this appeal argues, that plaintiff only undertook in the agreement “to secure the Mission Dry franchise for and in behalf of the proposed partnership.” The existence of this provision in the final agreement does not militate against plaintiff having represented that he had the exclusive franchise; it rather strengthens belief that he did actually make the representation. The defendant believed, or was made to believe, that plaintiff was the grantee of an exclusive franchise. Thus it is that it was also agreed upon that the franchise was to be transferred to the name of the partnership, and that, upon its dissolution or termination, the same shall be reassigned to the plaintiff.
Again, the immediate reaction of defendant, when in California he learned that plaintiff did not have the exclusive franchise, was to reduce, as he himself testified, plaintiff’s participation in the net profits to one half of that agreed upon. He could not have had such a feeling had not plaintiff actually made him believe that he(plaintiff) was the exclusive grantee of the franchise.

2. No. In consequence, article 1270 of the Spanish Civil Code distinguishes two kinds of (civil) fraud, the causal fraud, which may be ground for the annulment of a contract, and the incidental deceit, which only renders the party who employs it liable for damages only. The Supreme Court has held that in order that fraud may vitiate consent, it must be the causal (dolo causante), not merely the incidental (dolo incidente) inducement to the making of the contract.
The record abounds with circumstances indicative of the fact that the principal consideration, the main cause that induced defendant to enter into the partnership agreement with plaintiff, was the ability of plaintiff to get the exclusive franchise to bottle and distribute for the defendant or for the partnership. The original draft prepared by defendant’s counsel was to the effect that plaintiff obligated himself to secure a franchise for the defendant. But if plaintiff was guilty of a false representation, this was not the causal consideration, or the principal inducement, that led plaintiff to enter into the partnership agreement. On the other hand, this supposed ownership of an exclusive franchise was actually the consideration or price plaintiff gave in exchange for the share of 30 per cent granted him in the net profits of the partnership business. Defendant agreed to give plaintiff 30 per cent share in the net profits because he was transferring his exclusive franchise to the partnership.
Having arrived at the conclusion that the contract cannot be declared null and void, may the agreement be carried out or executed? The SC finds no merit in the claim of plaintiff that the partnership was already a fait accompli from the time of the operation of the plant, as it is evident from the very language of the agreement that the parties intended that the execution of the agreement to form a partnership was to be carried out at a later date. , The defendant may not be compelled against his will to carry out the agreement nor execute the partnership papers. The law recognizes the individual’s freedom or liberty to do an act he has promised to do, or not to do it, as he pleases.

Dispostive Postion: With modification above indicated, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed.

Digest: Villaber vs COMELEC

PABLO C. VILLABER, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and REP. DOUGLAS R. CAGAS, respondents.

Subject: Public Corporation
Doctrine: Disqualification (Sec 40, LGC; “Moral Turpitude”)

FACTS: Petitioner Villaber and respondent Douglas R. Cagas were rival candidates for a congressional seat in the First District of Davao del Sur during the May 14, 2001 elections. Villaber filed his certificate of candidacy for Congressman on February 19, 2001, while Cagas filed his on February 28, 2001.
On March 4, 2001, Cagas filed with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor of COMELEC Davao del Sur, a consolidated petition to disqualify Villaber and to cancel the latter’s certificate of candidacy due to the fact that Villaber was convicted by the RTC for violation of BP22 and was sentenced to suffer 1 year imprisonment. The check that bounced was in the sum of P100,000.00. Cagas further alleged that this crime involves moral turpitude; hence, under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code, he is disqualified to run for any public office. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision. Undaunted, Villaber filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari assailing the CA’s Decision. However, in its Resolution of October 26, 1992, this Court (Third Division) dismissed the petition. On February 2, 1993, our Resolution became final and executory. Cagas also asserted that Villaber made a false material representation in his certificate of candidacy that he is “Eligible for the office I seek to be elected” – which false statement is a ground to deny due course or cancel the said certificate pursuant to Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
In his answer to the disqualification suit, Villaber countered mainly that his conviction has not become final and executory because the affirmed Decision was not remanded to the trial court for promulgation in his presence. Furthermore, even if the judgment of conviction was already final and executory, it cannot be the basis for his disqualification since violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not involve moral turpitude.
After the opposing parties submitted their respective position papers, the case was forwarded to the COMELEC, Manila, for resolution.
On April 30, 2001, the COMELEC finding merit in Cagas’ petition, issued the challenged Resolution declaring Villaber disqualified as “a candidate for and from holding any elective public office” and canceling his certificate of candidacy. The COMELEC ruled that a conviction for violation of B.P Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude following the ruling of this Court en banc in the administrative case of People vs. Atty. Fe Tuanda. Villaber filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the COMELEC en banc in a Resolution.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: The sole issue for our Resolution is whether or not violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude.
HELD: The COMELEC believes it is. In disqualifying petitioner Villaber from being a candidate for Congressman, the COMELEC applied Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides:
“Sec. 12. Disqualifications. – Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months, or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
“The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified.”
As to the meaning of “moral turpitude,” we have consistently adopted the definition in Black’s Law Dictionary as “an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.”
In In re Vinzon,the term “moral turpitude” is considered as encompassing “everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals.”
We, however, clarified in Dela Torre vs. Commission on Elections that “not every criminal act involves moral turpitude,” and that “as to what crime involves moral turpitude is for the Supreme Court to determine.”We further pronounced therein that:
“…in International Rice Research Institute vs. NLRC, the Court admitted that it cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by merely classifying a crime as malum in se or as malum prohibitum. In the final analysis, whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends on the circumstances surrounding the case.

In the case at bar, petitioner does not assail the facts and circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime. In effect, he admits all the elements of the crime for which he was convicted. At any rate, the question of whether or not the crime involves moral turpitude can be resolved by analyzing its elements alone, as we did in Dela Torre which involves the crime of fencing punishable by a special law.
Petitioner was charged for violating B.P. Blg. 22 under the following Information:
“That on or about February 13, 1986, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to Efren D. Sawal to apply on account or for value Bank of Philippine Islands (Plaza Cervantes, Manila) Check No. 958214 dated February 13, 1986 payable to Efren D. Sawal in the amount of P100,000.00, said accused well knowing that at the time of issue he did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check, when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof, was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds, and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay said Efren D. Sawal the amount of said check or to make arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.” (Emphasis ours)

The elements of the offense under the above provision are:

1. The accused makes, draws or issues any check to apply to account or for value;

2. The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and

3. The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or it would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.[19]

The presence of the second element manifests moral turpitude. We held that a conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 “imports deceit” and “certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a person….”Thus, paraphrasing Black’s definition, a drawer who issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges on his private duties he owes his fellow men or society in a manner contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty or good morals.
In fine, we find no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent COMELEC in issuing the assailed Resolutions.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Digest: Garvida vs Sales

LYNETTE G. GARVIDA, petitioner, vs. FLORENCIO G. SALES, JR., THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ELECTION OFFICER DIONISIO F. RIOS and PROVINCIAL SUPERVISOR NOLI PIPO, respondents.
G.R. No. 124893

Subject: Public Corporation
Doctrine: Qualification of Elective Officers (SK)

FACTS:
Petitioner Lynette Garvida seeks to annul and set aside the order dated May 2, 1996 of respondent COMELEC en banc suspending her proclamation as the duly elected Chairman of the SK of Barangay San Lorenzo, Municipality of Bangui, Ilocos Norte.
– On March 16, 1996, petitioner applied for registration as member and voter of the Katipunan ng Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo. The Board of Election Tellers, however, denied her application on the ground that she being then twenty-one years and ten (10) months old, exceeded the age limit for membership in the Katipunan ng Kabataan as laid down in Section 3 [b] of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824.
– On April 2, she filed a “Petition for Inclusion as Registered Kabataang Member and Voter” with the MCTC. In a decision dated April 18, 1996, the said court found petitioner qualified and ordered her registration as member and voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan. The Board of Election Tellers appealed to the Regional Trial Court. The presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, however, inhibited himself from acting on the appeal due to his close association with petitioner.
– On April 23, Garvida filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Chairman, Sangguniang Kabataan, Barangay San Lorenzo, Municipality of Bangui, Province of Ilocos Norte. In a letter dated April 23, 1996, Election Officer Rios, per advice of Provincial Election Supervisor, disapproved petitioner’s certificate of candidacy again due to her age. Petitioner, however, appealed to COMELEC Regional Director Asperin who set aside the order of respondent Rios and allowed petitioner to run.
– On May 2, respondent Rios issued a memorandum to petitioner informing her of her ineligibility and giving her 24 hours to explain why her certificate of candidacy should not be disapproved.
– Earlier and without the knowledge of the COMELEC officials, private respondent Florencio G. Sales, Jr., a rival candidate for Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan, filed with the COMELEC en banc a “Petition of Denial and/or Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy” against petitioner Garvida for falsely representing her age qualification in her certificate of candidacy. The petition was sent by facsimile and registered mail on April 29, 1996 to the Commission on Elections National Office, Manila.
On May 2, 1996, the same day acting on the facsimile, respondent Rios issued the memorandum to petitioner, the COMELEC en banc issued an order directing the Board of Election Tellers and Board of Canvassers of Barangay San Lorenzo to suspend the proclamation of petitioner in the event she won in the election.
– On May 6, 1996, election day, petitioner garnered 78 votes as against private respondent’s votes of 76. In accordance with the May 2, 1996 order of the COMELEC en banc, the Board of Election Tellers did not proclaim petitioner as the winner. Hence, the instant petition for certiorari was filed on May 27, 1996.
– On June 2, 1996, however, the Board of Election Tellers proclaimed petitioner the winner for the position of SK chairman, Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The proclamation was “without prejudice to any further action by the Commission on Elections or any other interested party.”
– On July 5, 1996, petitioner ran in the Pambayang Pederasyon ng mga Sangguniang Kabataan for the municipality of Bangui, Ilocos Norte. She won as Auditor and was proclaimed one of the elected officials of the Pederasyon.

ISSUES: 1) WON the COMELEC en banc has jurisdiction to act on the petition to deny or cancel her certificate of candidacy. (not pubcor)
2) WON cancellation of her certificate of candidacy on the ground that she has exceeded the age requirement to run as an elective official of the SK is valid
HELD:
1) Section 532 (a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides that the conduct of the SK elections is under the supervision of the COMELEC and shall be governed by the Omnibus Election Code. The Omnibus Election Code, in Section 78, Article IX, governs the procedure to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy.
In relation thereto, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy for an elective office may be filed with the Law Department of the COMELEC on the ground that the candidate has made a false material representation in his certificate. The petition may be heard and evidence received by any official designated by the COMELEC after which the case shall be decided by the COMELEC itself and that the jurisdiction over a petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy lies with the COMELEC sitting in Division, not en banc. Cases before a Division may only be entertained by the COMELEC en banc when the required number of votes to reach a decision, resolution, order or ruling is not obtained in the Division. Moreover, only motions to reconsider decisions, resolutions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC in Division are resolved by the COMELEC en banc. It is therefore the COMELEC sitting in Divisions that can hear and decide election cases.
In the instant case, the COMELEC en banc did not refer the case to any of its Divisions upon receipt of the petition. It therefore acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion when it entertained the petition and issued the order of May 2, 1996.
The COMELEC en banc also erred when it failed to note that the petition itself did not comply with the formal requirements of pleadings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Every pleading before the COMELEC must be printed, mimeographed or typewritten in legal size bond paper and filed in at least ten (10) legible copies. Pleadings must be filed directly with the proper Clerk of Court of the COMELEC personally, or, by registered mail.
In the instant case, the subject petition was not in proper form. Only two (2) copies of the petition were filed with the COMELEC.[19] Also, the COMELEC en banc issued its Resolution on the basis of the petition transmitted by facsimile, not by registered mail.
2) The Katipunan ng Kabataan was originally created by PD 684 in 1975 as the Kabataang Barangay, a barangay youth organization composed of all residents of the barangay who were at least 15 years but less than 18 years of age. RA 7160 changed the Kabataang Barangay into the Katipunan ng Kabataan. It, however, retained the age limit of the members laid down in B.P. 337 at 15 but not more than 21 years old. The affairs of the Katipunan ng Kabataan are administered by the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) composed of a chairman and seven (7) members who are elected by the Katipunan ng Kabataan. The chairman automatically becomes ex-officio member of the Sangguniang Barangay. A member of the SK holds office for a term of three (3) years, unless sooner removed for cause, or becomes permanently incapacitated, dies or resigns from office.
Under Section 424 of the Local Government Code, a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan must be: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) an actual resident of the barangay for at least six months; (c) 15 but not more than 21 years of age; and (d) duly registered in the list of the Sangguniang Kabataan or in the official barangay list. Section 428 of the Code requires that an elective official of the Sangguniang Kabataan must be: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) a qualified voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan; (c) a resident of the barangay at least one (1) year immediately preceding the election; (d) at least 15 years but not more than 21 years of age on the day of his election; (e) able to read and write; and (f) must not have been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.
For the May 6, 1996 SK elections, the COMELEC interpreted Sections 424 and 428 of the Local Government Code of 1991 in Resolution No. 2824 and defined how a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan becomes a qualified voter and an elective official… voter must be born between May 6, 1975 and May 6, 1981, inclusive; and (c) a resident of the Philippines for at least one (1) year and an actual resident of the barangay at least six (6) months immediately preceding the elections. A candidate for the SK must: (a) possess the foregoing qualifications of a voter; (b) be a resident in the barangay at least one (1) year immediately preceding the elections; and (c) able to read and write.
Except for the question of age, petitioner has all the qualifications of a member and voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan and a candidate for the Sangguniang Kabataan.
Petitioner’s age is admittedly beyond the limit set in Section 3 [b] of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824. Petitioner, however, argues that Section 3 [b] of Resolution No. 2824 is unlawful, ultra vires and beyond the scope of Sections 424 and 428 of the Local Government Code of 1991. She contends that the Code itself does not provide that the voter must be exactly 21 years of age on election day. She urges that so long as she did not turn twenty-two (22) years old, she was still twenty-one years of age on election day and therefore qualified as a member and voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan and as candidate for the SK elections.
Section 424 of the Code sets a member’s maximum age at 21 years only. There is no further provision as to when the member shall have turned 21 years of age. On the other hand, Section 428 provides that the maximum age of an elective SK official is 21 years old “on the day of his election.” The addition of the phrase “on the day of his election” is an additional qualification. The member may be more than 21 years of age on election day or on the day he registers as member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan. The elective official, however, must not be more than 21 years old on the day of election. The distinction is understandable considering that the Code itself provides more qualifications for an elective SK official than for a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan. Dissimilum dissimilis est ratio. The courts may distinguish when there are facts and circumstances showing that the legislature intended a distinction or qualification.
The provision that an elective official of the SK should not be more than 21 years of age on the day of his election is very clear. The Local Government Code speaks of years, not months nor days. When the law speaks of years, it is understood that years are of 365 days each. One born on the first day of the year is consequently deemed to be one year old on the 365th day after his birth — the last day of the year. In computing years, the first year is reached after completing the first 365 days. After the first 365th day, the first day of the second 365-day cycle begins. The phrase “not more than 21 years of age” means not over 21 years, not beyond 21 years. It means 21 365-day cycles. It does not mean 21 years and one or some days or a fraction of a year because that would be more than 21 365-day cycles. “Not more than 21 years old” is not equivalent to “less than 22 years old,” contrary to petitioner’s claims. The law does not state that the candidate be less than 22 years on election day. The requirement that a candidate possess the age qualification is founded on public policy and if he lacks the age on the day of the election, he can be declared ineligible.
Ineligibility, on the other hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for holding public office. Ineligibility is not one of the grounds enumerated in Section 435 for succession of the SK Chairman.
To avoid a hiatus in the office of SK Chairman, the Court deems it necessary to order that the vacancy be filled by the SK member chosen by the incumbent SK members of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte by simple majority from among themselves. The member chosen shall assume the office of SK Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term, and shall discharge the powers and duties, and enjoy the rights and privileges appurtenant to said office.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed and petitioner Lynette G. Garvida is declared ineligible for being over the age qualification for candidacy in the May 6, 1996 elections of the Sangguniang Kabataan, and is ordered to vacate her position as Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The Sangguniang Kabataan member voted by simple majority by and from among the incumbent Sangguniang Kabataan members of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte shall assume the office of Sangguniang Kabataan Chairman of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte for the unexpired portion of the term.

Digest: Cruz vs CA

Cruz vs CA
G.R. No. L-44178

Subject: Public Corporation
Doctrine: Supervision of Public Market

Facts:
Private respondents filed a class suit before the CFI in behalf of the vendors and stall holders in Padre Rada market against the Mayor and petitioner Ricardo Cruz for the annulment of Mayor Villegas’ decision to withdraw the said market as a public market. Cruz states that he and his business associates have been the owners and operators of the Padre Rada Market at Tondo, Manila for more than 25 years. It was only turned into a public market by virtue of Resolution No. 230, as amended by Resolution No. 406, both series of 1949.
On May 26, 1970, the management of said market represent by petitioner Cruz wrote Mayor Villegas that the management was withdrawing three-fourths of the area of the market “from the direct supervision and control of the City Treasurer’s Office effective on June 15, 1970, and from said date the withdrawn portion shall cease to function and operate as a public market.” The respondent-vendors, who were likewise notified of such withdrawal, protested such move.
After several exchanges of referrals, indorsements, and communications, Mayor Villegas allowed the withdrawal in the light of the CA’s decision in CA-G. R. Nos. 39999-R, and 40000-R upholding the right of the operators of the Elcano Market to withdraw their property from its use as a public market stating, among others, that approval for the withdrawal by the City of Manila is not even necessary. Motions for reconsiderations were denied.
The lower court rendered the decision in favor of the City mayor holding that the decision was valid. On appeal, the CA reversed the CFI’s decision. CA denied the withdrawal by the Manila City Mayor of government-control and supervision “until legal conditions and equitable justification for the withdrawal by private parties obtain.” A subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence this case.
ISSUE: WON the City Mayor may validly withdraw Padre Rada Market as a public market.
HELD:
No. The Municipal Board of Manila with the approval of then Mayor Manuel de la Fuente authorized the disputed premises to be operated as a public market under its direct control and supervision as embodied in Resolution No. 230, amended by Resolution No. 406, both series of 1949. The Municipal Board acted pursuant to its legislative powers vested by Republic Act No. 409 (Revised Charter of the City of Manila), particularly Sec. 18 (cc) which provides:
Subject to the provisions of ordinances issued by the Department of Health in accordance with law, to provide for the establishment and maintenance and fix the fees for the use of, and regulate public stables, laundries, and baths, and public markets and slaughterhouses, and prohibit or permit the establishment or operation within the city limits of public markets and slaughterhouses by any person, entity, association, or corporation other than the city.
The respondent Court of Appeals held that Mayor Villegas had no authority to allow such withdrawal as “it is axiomatic that only the power that created it can withdraw it.”
On the other hand, the petitioner contends that the Padre Rada Market was not created but merely authorized to operate as a public market by the Municipal Board. Accordingly, there is nothing in the said resolutions which obligates or compels petitioner Cruz and his business associates to continue operating the said market for as long as the Municipal Board desires it.
The records show that the petitioner wants to convert the major portion of the Padre Rada Market into a private market to enable him to raise the rentals for the stalls. It is obvious that he wants to remove the market from the control and supervision of city authorities.
By the very nature of a market, * its location, opening, operations, and closure must be regulated by government. It is not a question of the petitioner’s right to run his market as he pleases but what agency or office should supervise its operations.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the Mayor had no legal authority to, by himself, allow the petitioner to withdraw the major portion of Padre Rada Market from its use as a public market, thereby also withdrawing it from the city’s constant supervision.
Since the operation of Padre Rada Market was authorized by a municipal board resolution and approved by the City Mayor, as provided by law, it follows that a withdrawal of the whole or any portion from use as a public market must be subject to the same joint action of the Board and the Mayor. The Mayor of Manila, by himself, cannot provide for the opening, operations, and closure of a public market. The withdrawal from the market’s public status was in fact objected to by the Manila City Treasurer and the Market Administrator in their memorandums and indorsements to the Mayor.
The Padre Rada Market is a public market and as such should be subject to the local government’s supervision and control. Its conversion into a private market or its closure must follow the procedures laid down by law.
WHEREFORE,, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

Digest: ACORD vs Zamora

ALTERNATIVE CENTER FOR ORGANIZATIONAL REFORMS AND DEVELOPMENT, INC., VS. ZAMORA
G.R. No. 144256

Subject: Public Corporation
Doctrine: Automatic release of IRA

Facts:
Pres. Estrada, pursuant to Sec 22, Art VII mandating the Pres to submit to Congress a budget of expenditures within 30 days before the opening of every regular session, submitted the National Expenditures program for FY 2000. The President proposed an IRA of P121,778,000,000. This became RA 8760, “AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY-ONE, TWO THOUSAND, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES” also known as General Appropriations Act (GAA) for the Year 2000. It provides under the heading “ALLOCATIONS TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS” that the IRA for local government units shall amount to P111,778,000,000”.
In another part of the GAA, under the heading “UNPROGRAMMED FUND,” it is provided that an amount of P10,000,000,000 (P10 Billion), apart from the P111,778,000,000 mentioned above, shall be used to fund the IRA, which amount shall be released only when the original revenue targets submitted by the President to Congress can be realized based on a quarterly assessment to be conducted by certain committees which the GAA specifies, namely, the Development Budget Coordinating Committee, the Committee on Finance of the Senate, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
Thus, while the GAA appropriates P111,778,000,000 of IRA as Programmed Fund, it appropriates a separate amount of P10 Billion of IRA under the classification of Unprogrammed Fund, the latter amount to be released only upon the occurrence of the condition stated in the GAA.
On August 22, 2000, a number of NGOs and POs, along with 3 barangay officials filed with this Court the petition at bar, for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus With Application for Temporary Restraining Order, against respondents then Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, then Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management Benjamin Diokno, then National Treasurer Leonor Magtolis-Briones, and the Commission on Audit, challenging the constitutionality of provision XXXVII (ALLOCATIONS TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS) referred to by petitioners as Section 1, XXXVII (A), and LIV (UNPROGRAMMED FUND) Special Provisions 1 and 4 of the GAA (the GAA provisions)
Petitioners contend that the said provisions violates the LGUs autonomy by unlawfully reducing the IRA allotted by 10B and by withholding its release by placing the same under “Unprogrammed funds”. Although the effectivity of the Year 2000 GAA has ceased, this Court shall nonetheless proceed to resolve the issues raised in the present case, it being impressed with public interest. Petitioners argue that the GAA violated the constitutional mandate of automatically releasing the IRAs when it made its release contingent on whether revenue collections could meet the revenue targets originally submitted by the President, rather than making the release automatic.
ISSUE: WON the subject GAA violates LGUs fiscal autonomy by not automatically releasing the whole amount of the allotted IRA.
HELD:
Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution provides:
SECTION 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them.
Petitioners argue that the GAA violated this constitutional mandate when it made the release of IRA contingent on whether revenue collections could meet the revenue targets originally submitted by the President, rather than making the release automatic. Respondents counterargue that the above constitutional provision is addressed not to the legislature but to the executive, hence, the same does not prevent the legislature from imposing conditions upon the release of the IRA.
Respondents thus infer that the subject constitutional provision merely prevents the executive branch of the government from “unilaterally” withholding the IRA, but not the legislature from authorizing the executive branch to withhold the same. In the words of respondents, “This essentially means that the President or any member of the Executive Department cannot unilaterally, i.e., without the backing of statute, withhold the release of the IRA.”
As the Constitution lays upon the executive the duty to automatically release the just share of local governments in the national taxes, so it enjoins the legislature not to pass laws that might prevent the executive from performing this duty. To hold that the executive branch may disregard constitutional provisions which define its duties, provided it has the backing of statute, is virtually to make the Constitution amendable by statute – a proposition which is patently absurd. If indeed the framers intended to allow the enactment of statutes making the release of IRA conditional instead of automatic, then Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution would have been worded differently.
Since, under Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution, only the just share of local governments is qualified by the words “as determined by law,” and not the release thereof, the plain implication is that Congress is not authorized by the Constitution to hinder or impede the automatic release of the IRA.
In another case, the Court held that the only possible exception to mandatory automatic release of the IRA is, as held in Batangas:
…if the national internal revenue collections for the current fiscal year is less than 40 percent of the collections of the preceding third fiscal year, in which case what should be automatically released shall be a proportionate amount of the collections for the current fiscal year. The adjustment may even be made on a quarterly basis depending on the actual collections of national internal revenue taxes for the quarter of the current fiscal year.
This Court recognizes that the passage of the GAA provisions by Congress was motivated by the laudable intent to “lower the budget deficit in line with prudent fiscal management.” The pronouncement in Pimentel, however, must be echoed: “[T]he rule of law requires that even the best intentions must be carried out within the parameters of the Constitution and the law. Verily, laudable purposes must be carried out by legal methods.”
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. XXXVII and LIV Special Provisions 1 and 4 of the Year 2000 GAA are hereby declared unconstitutional insofar as they set apart a portion of the IRA, in the amount of P10 Billion, as part of the UNPROGRAMMED FUND.

Digest: Manila Electric Co, Inc. vs Province of Laguna

Manila Electric Co, Inc. vs Province of Laguna
G.R. No. 131359

Subject: Public Corporation
Doctrine: Power to generate revenues

Facts:
MERALCO was granted franchise for the supply of electric light, heat and power by certain municipalities of the Province of Laguna including, Biñan, Sta Rosa, San Pedro, Luisiana, Calauan and Cabuyao. On 19 January 1983, MERALCO was likewise granted a franchise by the National Electrification Administration to operate an electric light and power service in the Municipality of Calamba, Laguna.
On 12 September 1991, Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the “Local Government Code of 1991,” was enacted to take effect on 01 January 1992 enjoining local government units to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, fees and charges, subject to the limitations expressed therein, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Pursuant to the provisions of the Code, respondent province enacted Laguna Provincial Ordinance providing for franchise tax at a rate of 50% of 1% of the gross annual receipts. Provincial Treasurer, then sent a demand letter to MERALCO for the corresponding tax payment.
Petitioner MERALCO paid the tax, which then amounted to P19,520,628.42, under protest. A formal claim for refund was thereafter sent by MERALCO to the Provincial Treasurer of Laguna claiming that the franchise tax it had paid and continued to pay to the National Government pursuant to P.D. 551 already included the franchise tax imposed by the Provincial Tax Ordinance. MERALCO contended that the imposition of a franchise tax under Section 2.09 of Laguna Provincial Ordinance No. 01-92, insofar as it concerned MERALCO, contravened the provisions of Section 1 of P.D. 551 which provides “Any provision of law or local ordinance to the contrary notwithstanding, the franchise tax payable by all grantees of franchises to generate, distribute and sell electric current for light, heat and power shall be two per cent (2%) of their gross receipts received from the sale of electric current and from transactions incident to the generation, distribution and sale of electric current… Such franchise tax shall be payable to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue or his duly authorized representative.”
On 28 August 1995, the claim for refund of petitioner was denied in a letter signed by Governor Jose D. Lina. In denying the claim, respondents relied on a more recent law, i.e., Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991, than the old decree invoked by petitioner.
On 14 February 1996, petitioner MERALCO filed with the RTC a complaint for refund against the Province of Laguna and also Benito R. Balazo in his capacity as the Provincial Treasurer of Laguna. RTC dismissed the complaint holding that the power to tax exercised by the province of Laguna was valid.

ISSUE: Whether or not the power to tax was validly exercised.

HELD:
Prefatorily, it might be well to recall that local governments do not have the inherent power to tax except to the extent that such power might be delegated to them either by the basic law or by statute. Presently, under Article X of the 1987 Constitution, a general delegation of that power has been given in favor of local government units.
Under the regime of the 1935 Constitution no similar delegation of tax powers was provided, and local government units instead derived their tax powers under a limited statutory authority. Whereas, then, the delegation of tax powers granted at that time by statute to local governments was confined and defined (outside of which the power was deemed withheld), the present constitutional rule (starting with the 1973 Constitution), however, would broadly confer such tax powers subject only to specific exceptions that the law might prescribe.
Under the now prevailing Constitution, where there is neither a grant nor a prohibition by statute, the tax power must be deemed to exist although Congress may provide statutory limitations and guidelines. The basic rationale for the current rule is to safeguard the viability and self-sufficiency of local government units by directly granting them general and broad tax powers. Nevertheless, the fundamental law did not intend the delegation to be absolute and unconditional; the constitutional objective obviously is to ensure that, while the local government units are being strengthened and made more autonomous,[6] the legislature must still see to it that (a) the taxpayer will not be over-burdened or saddled with multiple and unreasonable impositions; (b) each local government unit will have its fair share of available resources; (c) the resources of the national government will not be unduly disturbed; and (d) local taxation will be fair, uniform, and just. The 1991 Code explicitly authorizes provincial governments, notwithstanding “any exemption granted by any law or other special law, x x x (to) impose a tax on businesses enjoying a franchise.” Indicative of the legislative intent to carry out the Constitutional mandate of vesting broad tax powers to local government units, the Local Government Code has effectively withdrawn under Section 193 thereof, tax exemptions or incentives theretofore enjoyed by certain entities. The Code, in addition, contains a general repealing clause in its Section 534 which states that “All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.”
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. No costs.